The Right to Communicate:

Democracy and the Digital Divide

Carolyn Cunningham, Ph.D. Student

Department of Radio-Television-Film

University of Texas at Austin

Email: carolync@mail.utexas.edu

Phone: 512-450-0125

Address: 4605 Avenue F

Austin, TX 78751

Abstract

There is much debate about whether a digital divide still exists within the United States. While some believe that Internet access is now widely available and affordable, others warn divides will continue to expand unless more government resources are made available to offset this recurrent social problem (Compaine 2001, Bertot 2003, Rowe 2003). The tension between these two oppositional positions lies within the broader issue of how speech rights are framed within the U.S. While the First Amendment guarantees freedom from censorship in some cases, it does not necessarily guarantee that the means to communicate are available to all citizens. Historically, the government’s role is to protect a “marketplace of ideas,” allowing conditions for the best ideas to prevail. However, there are differing ideas about how best to promote the marketplace. In relation to media regulation, Supreme Court rulings on speech rights focus on media specificity, balancing access, such as interpreting how airwaves should be used for the public interest in broadcast policy, and content, such as protecting commercial speech over individual speech as in the case of print media. Framing speech rights in this economic context fails to address why communication is a crucial component to democratic processes (Kairys 1990, Mensch 1990, Sunstein 1993). Since the 1990s, policymakers apply this ideology of the marketplace to address the digital divide. Funding for initiatives such as the E-rate program and public access centers assumes that providing infrastructure will necessarily lead to community development, with little understanding of why citizens should have the means to communicate. The technological determinism present in these policies not only overshadows the underlying role of communication in sustaining democracy, but also fails to make provisions for technological change. Trends toward media consolidation and convergence call for new frameworks for addressing media access (Stein 2003).

In this paper, I argue for a re-conceptualization of digital divide policy based on the emerging notion of the right to communicate which is present in international social movements. International efforts, including the United Nations sponsored World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) held in Geneva in 2003, incorporate a sense of collective rights into their initiatives. Collective rights broaden the notion of access to technology to an understanding of how communication helps sustain democracy, indigenous culture, and basic human needs (Hamelink 2004). Some communication scholars and activists, however, advocate adding the category of the right to communicate to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) to ensure that as access to technology is distributed, so is access to communication processes (D’Arcy 1969, Fisher 1982, Golding and Murdock 1989). Using a comparative analysis of international efforts that place communication rights, rather than speech rights, at the forefront of policy, I highlight some of the shortcomings of U.S. approaches to the digital divide. U.S. involvement in these projects is limited because of conflicting ideologies of how governments should intervene to develop media access policies. However, incorporating communication rights into U.S. interpretations of speech rights helps to reveal what is at stake in addressing the digital divide both nationally and internationally.

The Right to Communicate:

Democracy and the Digital Divide

“They’re telling Americans the problem has been solved, and even by the plain statistics it shows the problem isn’t solved…It’s like putting lipstick on a pig, and saying it’s no longer a pig”[1]

The “digital divide” has become an all-too familiar buzzword to the American public. While the concept seems to be clear, solutions to the problem remain ambiguous and ineffective. Originally announced in the National Telecommunications and Information Administration’s (NTIA) 1995 report Falling Through the Net: Defining the Digital Divide, the problem is most often framed in terms of lags in infrastructure (US Department of Commerce, 1995). Since the problem has been identified, initiatives by non-profit and government groups address this social issue primarily through funding public access sites in underserved communities. In recent years, there is much debate about whether or not the digital divide still exists within the United States. While some believe that Internet access is now widely available and affordable, others still warn these gaps will continue to grow unless more government resources are made available to offset the problem (Compaine 2001, Bertot 2003, Rowe 2003). Outside of the United States, the digital divide is much more pronounced. A recent report by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) suggests that although western industrialized nations have at least fifty percent Internet penetration rates, geographic regions such as Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America have less than ten percent Internet penetration (ITU, 2003). International efforts to address these disparities continue to grow. Unlike U.S. initiatives that focus merely on access and infrastructure, these projects incorporate the notion that communication is a basic human right. Some of these efforts include developing innovative technologies to address geographic barriers, such as wireless technologies that bring broadband access to isolated areas, providing funds for nations to purchase hardware and software, and advocating for open source software.

The idea of technological divides is not simply a result of our modern condition. Historians of technology chart the diffusion of a variety of inventions in order to show how technology is embedded within social structures (Cowan, 1997; Wacjman, 1991; Winston, 1998). These scholars study how social inequalities become illuminated through technology. While some researchers apply a social construction approach to understanding the digital divide, many scholars and policymakers continue to frame the problem in terms of infrastructure, rather than addressing the underlying reasons why people should have access to new technologies and what they should do with them once they do have access.

In this paper, I argue for a re-conceptualization of digital divide policy based on the emerging notion of the right to communicate which is articulated in international social movements. The need to reframe the digital divide is located within the larger problem of how speech rights are understood within the United States. While the First Amendment guarantees freedom from censorship in some cases, it does not necessarily guarantee that the means to communicate are available to all citizens. The government’s role is to protect a “marketplace of ideas,” allowing the best ideas to prevail. In relation to media regulation, protecting the marketplace often is dependent on media specificity. Historically the Supreme Court tries to balance access, such as interpreting how airwaves should be used for the public interest in the case of broadcast media, and content, such as protecting commercial speech over individual speech in the case of print media. However, as the lines between content and conduit continue to blur with the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the need for new approaches to understanding speech rights becomes pressing. Trends toward deregulation, cross-ownership, and increased market penetration rates provide limited opportunities for independent voices and viewpoints. The marketplace, in other words, is only available to those with the most resources.

In this paper, I provide an overview of speech rights in the national and international context to argue for broader intervention into access to new technologies. In the U.S., speech rights are framed in a negative context failing to address why communication is a crucial component to democratic processes. Indeed, current frameworks are no longer sufficient for ensuring democratic communication because of trends toward media consolidation and convergence. Using a comparative analysis of international efforts that place communication rights, rather than speech rights, at the forefront of policy, I hope to reinvigorate debates about the importance of addressing the digital divide both nationally and internationally. This paper addresses the following questions: what is the role of communication in democratic societies?; who gets to speak?; and why should we speak?.

The Role of Communication in Democracy

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

The rapid spread of Nazism and fascism at the beginning of the twentieth century and the knowledge of the inhuman atrocities committed during World War II compelled leaders from the world community to come together to establish guidelines for ensuring human rights and to create alliances to prevent such abuses of power from happening again.[2] World leaders, as well as members of non-government organizations (NGOs), came together in 1945 to sign the Charter of the United Nations (UN). The founders hoped to prevent conflicts and work toward peaceful development. Although the Cold War made the enforcement of the UN difficult to sustain, since 1991, the UN has taken a more prominent role in peacekeeping operations. The U.S. has been in ongoing conflicts with the U.N. For example, in 1985, the U.S. withdrew its participation from UNESCO because of disagreements over cultural policy.[3] More recently, following the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. defied the UN’s recommendation on how to proceed in Iraq. The conflict between the U.S. and the UN stems from differing ideologies of the role of government in democratic societies. Often the U.S. believes that UN policies favor state control while impinging on individual rights. The U.S. position is to protect freedom of speech for individuals and is critical of governments that promote censorship. However, striking a balance of power between governments and individuals is a crucial component in developing communication policies.

One of the most significant actions by the UN was the establishment of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. The UDHR is considered to be the most explicit document defining human rights (Freeman 2002). Human rights are based on the notion that humans hold certain rights to dignity and that these rights should be guaranteed by the international community. Human rights are integral to peace, security, and world development, which are fundamental goals of the UN. The preamble of the charter states that the mission of the document is “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small”(Freeman, 2002: 35). The 30 articles of the UDHR protect basic human needs, such as food and shelter, as well as cultural and political rights. Article 19, guaranteeing freedom of expression and opinion, lays the groundwork for understanding the role of communication in society. Article 19 states that freedom of expression includes “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice” (Hamelink 2004, 169).

As Freeman (2002) writes, the UDHR is heavily influenced by Lockean notions of natural rights. Natural rights refers to the ideology that humans have certain freedoms and rights given to them at birth. Natural rights are connected to a strong sense of morality that exists prior to society. Rights are “just claims or entitlements derived from moral and/or legal rules” (Freeman, 2002: 6). Early democratic theory incorporated these guidelines into the formation of law. Article 1 reflects the influence of natural rights, stating that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood” (Hamelink, 2004: 157).

Beyond political and cultural rights, the UDHR most recently incorporates the notion of collective rights. For example, Article 27 states, “everyone has the right to freely participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefit” (Hamelink, 2004: 160). Collective rights, which form the theoretical basis for communication rights discussed in the next section, expand the rights for individuals to groups and cultures. The growing imbalance of power between industrialized and developing countries resulting from globalization compelled concerned world leaders to establish protection for collective identities. Indigenous populations are especially concerned with the influence of dominant cultures. Collective rights provide a framework for ensuring self-determination for societies, access to a healthy environment, the right to peace, and the right to food security. Essential to collective rights is the notion of the right to development, in which societies can exist without pressure from outside forces. From an American liberal democratic perspective, collective rights have been the most controversial since many feared they granted too much state control without ensuring a balance of power. Indeed, collective rights are oppositional to speech rights because they favor the rights of groups over the rights of individuals.

The UDHR has not been without its critics and has been a site of controversy. Many social scientists and modern day social theorists, such as Marx, Bentham, and Burke, were skeptical of the idea of natural rights. As a more positivist trend in social theory questioned the existence of natural rights, these theorists argued that rights were social in nature and created by social processes. In other words, rights derive from humans not nature. A universal document that attempts to guarantee rights, they argue, ignores some of the nuances of cultures and communities that may have different notions of the origins of rights. Additionally, critics of the UDHR suggest that its biases are Western in nature, ignoring some of the needs of specific communities. For example, while the UDHR guarantees freedom of religious choice, some cultures enforce strict religious orthodoxy. Finally, one of the major criticisms of the UDHR is that it is difficult to enforce (Freeman 2002). However, although the UDHR is not a binding treaty, it does have legal credence and is seen as binding international law enforceable by the International Court.

The Right to Communicate

Freedom of expression and access to information are of central concern to the UN. As the field of communication developed in the 1950s and 60s, scholars and activists were interested in expanding the spheres of both expression and access. The concept of the right to communicate was first articulated by Jean D’Arcy, former UN official, in 1969. While D’Arcy was originally writing about the diffusion of satellite broadcasting, his vision is still supported today. In the late 1960s, there was significant concern that satellite communication be made available to all nations indiscriminately. Many believed that access to satellite broadcasting should not be confined to only the most wealthy nations. During this time, the role of mass media was seen as a powerful tool for providing information to citizens. There was much fear that states would prevent citizens from accessing information or that governments would censor news produced by their citizens. Indeed, D’Arcy was concerned that while Article 19 protects media content and freedom of expression, it does not offer a framework for providing the means through which to communicate. The concept of the right to communicate, then, was designed to address media access.

D’Arcy’s concerns were a response to both the advent of new communication technologies and academic research by communication scholars who analyzed the role of communication in society. In order to ensure democratic communication and provide protections for human rights, D’Arcy believed that new frameworks needed to respond to modern conditions. The goal in communication policy at the time was to ensure that the content of messages were free and accessible. However, the availability and capability of new technologies lends itself to a reworking of policy that places communication processes at the forefront. For example, broadband connections have allowed for convergence of traditional media systems, such as telecommunications and broadcasting. Convergence allows more outlets for interactive communication, as well as production of media by alternative voices. Broadband technologies are expensive in terms of hardware and infrastructure. As these technologies are seen as essential for economic development and cultural sustainability, rather than luxurious commodities, world leaders are placing acquisition and diffusion of these technologies at the forefront of policy agendas. One of the main goals of the UN’s Millennium Project is to bring broadband to developing countries.[4] These development projects help to spur innovation in technology. For example, in 2002, Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the UN, released statement to technology leaders in Silicon Valley stating, “we need to think of ways to bring wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi) application to the developing world, so as to make the use of unlicensed radio spectrum to deliver cheap and fast Internet…Surely experts can think of many more ideas along these lines” (Annan 2002).

In part, D’Arcy’s vision of communication rights emerged from a critique of the use of information and communication without distinction. For example, concerns about abusive uses of information content, such as propaganda or misleading information, became a major focus of concern with the increase in outlets for receiving information, such as radio and television. However, with new understandings of how technologies help to mediate communication, policymakers were urged to establish a more specific declaration about the role of media in communication processes. D’Arcy and his successors promote a framework of communication as an interactive process. Mass communication, such as in the case of broadcast media, is traditionally a one-way form of communication in which information is sent from one channel to many receivers. The differences between communication and information reflect both technological and social advances. Innovations are embedded in social systems and influenced by social processes (Lessig 2001). Understanding the distinctions between information and communication is increasingly important in trying to understand the framework of the information society. The notion of the information society refers to the significance of processing and exchanging information as well as the growing dependency on new technology infrastructures for communication. Additionally, the role of information technologies provides the backbone of many social services worldwide. The conceptualization of the information society leads to a growing concern for countries that do not have adequate infrastructure to participate. D’Arcy’s vision is especially relevant in analyzing the digital divide. Underlying the diffusion of technological systems are certain assumptions about which technologies and content are most relevant to certain societies, how people will use technology, and who owns and controls the content.

The framework of a right to communicate is seen not just a right, but also a human need. Without this right, humans can be subject to dehumanization and alienation. Aldo Armando Cocca (1982) theorizes about the difference between rights and freedoms. His framework begins to separate out freedom of expression from the right to communicate. In traditional political theory, rights imply protection by laws that should be obeyed. Rights, then, are exercised by individuals. The idea of freedom instead implies choice and exists in action. Freedom can exist in liberation from or toward something. As Cocca writes, the idea of rights also gives birth to certain social needs, such as infrastructures that ensure that rights can be attained.

Sommerland (1982) helps to define where responsibility lies in enforcing communication rights lies. He writes,

while the right to communicate may have first been conceived as an individual human right, the concept has relevance at the societal and national levels. The rights of nations to participate in a two-way flow of information of a basis of equality links the right to communicate concept to the international debate on the ‘free flow’ of information and ‘balance; in the exchange of news. And, this, of course, was the starting point of the demand for a new world information order. (132)

Sommerland identifies several cultural conditions essential for deriving the right to communicate, including the belief that a free and balanced flow of information between individuals, groups, communities and nations is a requirement for the fullest development of society. Vertical flows of information, for example from the communications-rich to communications-poor, do not sufficiently meet the needs of citizens. Instead, laws should protect multiple directions of communication flows. Adequate facilities for producing media should be equitably distributed within and between societies. Finally, national communication policies should be developed by states in order to ensure these conditions are maintained.

From D’Arcy’s concept came action to incorporate communication rights into policies and initiatives. UNESCO followed on these recommendations and formed the International Commission for the Study of Communication to address communication rights. The Commission released a report in 1980 titled Many Voices, One World, providing an overview of possible threats to democratic communication. Sean MacBride was one of the lead authors of this report and much of the report urged an incorporation of the right to communicate within communication policies. As the report states,

without a two-way flow between participants in the process, without the existence of multiple information sources permitting wider selection, without more opportunity for each individual to reach decisions based on a broad awareness of divergent facts and viewpoints, without increased participation by readers, viewers, and listeners in the decision-making and programming activities of the media—true democratization will not become a reality. (55)

Desmond Fisher, who also worked on the committee, helped to prepare The Right to Communicate: A Status Report, released in 1982. Several trends in modern development, including the spread of literacy, the spread of democracy, growth of multi-cultural consciousness, imbalance of resources, new technology, and interdependence of nations, call for radical approaches to ensure communication rights. Technology, then, should be used as a tool to promote democracy, rather than an end in itself. As Fisher writes,

the existing formulations are seen to lack a philosophical basis and to be incomplete, incoherent and insufficiently integrated. They confuse communications freedoms at various levels and do not provide a framework within which a hierarchy of communications rights, freedoms and entitlements of different degrees can be constructed. (7)

These shortcomings he speaks of are a result of new technologies, such as the Internet and wireless communication.

In the 1980s, there was much discussion about the right to communicate, however by the 1990s, this debate has practically disappeared. Recently, though, trends toward privatization of media systems and media consolidation have helped to re-envision the need for communication rights. For example, Golding and Murdock (1989) are critical of privatization of the British media system and argue that a new notion of citizenship must be included in communication policies. They draw upon T.H. Marhsall’s (1949) notion of citizenship, which is influenced by civil rights, political rights and social rights, the same approach to rights protected under the UDHR. Murdock and Golding argue that the fundamental right to communicate is an essential process of citizenship. A revision of citizenship should include provisions for the means to allow citizens to participate fully in society. Placing citizenship at the center of communication policies should be a priority.

They propose that there are three main connections between communication and citizenship. The first two, access to information and access to technology, are similar to those tendencies in the U.S. Their third assertion proves to be most interesting. As they write “they [citizens] must be able to recognize themselves and their aspirations in the range of representations offered within the central communications sectors and be able to contribute to developing these representations” (183). This framework calls for both production and consumption to be universally accessible to citizens to ensure their democratic participation. Murdock and Golding are skeptical of a system which determines access based on income because it continues to contribute to persistent social inequalities. As they write “markets address people primarily in their role as consumer rather than as citizens” (192). Freedom to choose information is not the same as communicating because this freedom focuses on the individual rather than the collective.

Some of the stumbling blocks in accepting the right to communicate as a new human right lie in the difficulty of definition and enforceability. In addressing the difficulty of defining the right to communicate as different from freedom of expression, Cocca writes, “the right to communicate is a fundamental right of mankind to express itself, to enter into relations with and to communicate interactively with other peoples and local communities, and that allocation of technological resources for these purposes be given high priority” (31). In this sense, ensuring the right to communicate must be coupled with the means to communicate. While some opponents argue that this right would be difficult to enforce, some believe that the concept itself is basic and difficult to define and does not need special protection. The Untied States has been suspicious of communication rights because of the notion that it falls in the realm of collective rights, protecting the needs of the state over those of the individual. Different approaches to the concept are based on how stakeholders frame the role of individuals in society. While many Western cultures see society emerging from the needs of individuals, at the time of Fischer’s writing, many socialist countries saw the individual as part of a larger social unit. These differences in social structure lead to different ideas about the role of communication in society. Often, some of the main differences are articulated in policies about freedom of expression and opinion. For example, in some socialist countries, rights were guaranteed collectively to groups, not to individuals per se. Freedom of expression, was guaranteed only if it also benefited society as a whole. However, in the U.S., freedom of expression is seen as a natural right that exists prior to society. As such, this right is defined in a negative context in which laws are designed to not impinge speech, rather than to promote speech. Defining speech as prior to rather than crucial for democratic society has several implications for media access and regulation, which I highlight in the proceeding sections.

Speech Rights in the U.S.

In the United States, the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that “Congress shall make no law…abridging freedom of speech, or, the press.” The wording of the First Amendment has been interpreted in various ways throughout U.S. history. Taken literally, the First Amendment, which guarantees speech rights, is defined negatively: that Congress will not be allowed to pass laws that hinder speech or the press. The notion that citizens have the natural right to speak freely fails to address changing social conditions in which speech occurs. As history shows, not everyone has the same ability to speak and certain types of speech is not always free.

The concept of free speech has come to dominate American ideology and democracy, yet as Kairys (1990) writes, there were no significant speech rights cases before World War I. It was not until the rise of social movements, such as the labor and birth control movements, that the idea of free speech became an organizing social platform. Censorship, including that of birth control materials and socialist ideology, inspired leaders of social movements to place free speech as a crucial agenda. Indeed, the 1919 Abrams v. United States case helped to establish the modern day notion of speech rights. In his dissent, Justice Holmes wrote “the best test of truth is the power of the thought itself to get itself accepted in the competition of the market” (630). Justice Holmes explicitly commented that the First Amendment promoted a marketplace of ideas where the best ideas would win out over the worst. Since this ruling, Kairys writes that the ideology of free speech, that access to the marketplace of ideas is available to everyone, has become naturalized and its assumptions relatively unquestioned.

The ideology behind free speech lies in liberal democratic theory, which is the heart of American political thought. Some of the ideas behind the need for free speech include the ability to attain truth, the process of democratic governance, provision of checks and balances on governmental power, and the need for individual fulfillment. How close we get to these ideals is subject to interpretation. In particular, there are several limits on free speech. While historically, political speech is the most protected form of speech, commercial speech and indecent sexual expression have been subject to restrictions. Obscenity, false advertising, libel, and fighting words are not constitutionally protected.

Several interpretations of the First Amendment have affected the role of media in society. Four dominant interpretations of speech rights include an absolutist approach, where the wording of the amendment is taken literally, an interventionist approach, allowing for the government to create conditions for free speech, an historical approach, which seeks the original intent of the founders, and an approach that tries to strike a balance between the rights of individuals and the role of government. In relation to media, often speech rights are determined based on the medium through which speech comes into being. For example, in Red Lion v. FCC (1969), the Court ruled that the scarcity of broadcast spectra allowed for the legitimacy of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to grant content-based restrictions on broadcasters. However, in Miami Herald v. Tornillo (1974), the Court ruled in favor of publishers over the public interest and decided that publishers had First Amendment protection to not publish views with which they did not agree.

The tension between these interpretations of speech rights reflects the broader traditions in liberal democratic thought. John Locke, considered the founder of modern liberal theory, believed that humans had certain rights that existed prior to society (Locke 1632/1992). Classic liberalists advocated for limited state interference and separation between the private and public spheres (Mensch 1990). Neoliberalism, a modern interpretation of liberalism, views the role of the state as maintaining freedom in the private sphere and ensuring competitive markets in the public sphere so that capitalism can prevail. Neoliberalism leads to a deregulatory approach to media industries (Litan and Niskanen 1998). The notion is that the market will allow for the best ideas to prevail and any governmental interference is not beneficial. Neoliberalists are skeptical of the need for the government to fund Internet access projects.

Participatory democratic theorists, on the other hand, argue that freedom requires more than the absence of government intervention and instead the government must act in the interest of its citizens. In this framework, the role of speech is to promote democracy. Participatory democratic theorists promote an equal access approach to Internet access, yet they are still invested in the liberal democratic notion that speech is a natural, rather than constructed, right.

The differences between the neoliberal and participatory democratic approach lies in the understanding of the relationship of the individual to society and the role of the state. Indeed these two different interpretations lead to different understandings of the First Amendment and the different role of media, access, and communication. While neoliberalists advocate limited state involvement to promote competition in the marketplace, participatory democratic theorists urge the government to provide resources for equal access. Both models, however, fall short of seeing communication as a basic human right.

Stein (2003) suggests that the government has a “compelling interest in protecting and promoting democratic speech” (113). She calls for reform of First Amendment law, arguing that conflicting understandings of speech rights in the U.S., as shown in some of the key Supreme Court cases, stem from the different approaches to liberal democratic philosophies. Stein recommends hybrid regulatory approaches to media systems as a way to protect democratic speech. A hybrid approach would utilize the capacity of technologies to provide multiple channels of communication to promote the rights of both media operators and public interests. I build on this analysis to also include a notion of communication rights. While providing multiple channels does allow for more speech opportunities, these channels do not guarantee the right to be heard.

The increasing trend away from allowing speech opportunities for individuals toward concentrated media ownership makes both neoliberal and participatory democratic approaches to speech rights in the U.S. difficult to achieve. Indeed, digital divide policy in the U.S. has wavered between a neoliberal approach, where the onus is placed on consumers to adopt new technologies, and participatory democratic thought, where technology itself is seen as promoting democratic participation. However, neither of these approaches is sufficient to protect the communication process. In this next section, I show how digital divide policy in the U.S. has failed to adequately address how new technologies will promote democracy. In the end, I argue that we need to go beyond looking at what the technology will accomplish to examine the underlying notion of democratic citizenship.

Digital Divide in the U.S.

In the U.S., the digital divide is conceived primarily as the gap between the technology have’s and the have-not’s. Some scholars suggest that this gap reflects existing social inequalities, since factors contributing to the divide continue to reflect economic, racial, and geographic factors (Cooper and Weaver, 2003; Servon, 2002; Warschauer 2003). The measurement of the digital divide is often aggregated in terms of technological diffusion and not other factors, such as the quality of access or how people use technology. The idea that technology itself will solve social problems is very prevalent in discourses about new technologies (Cowan 1997). However, a more theoretical framework of the role of communication in society can reinvigorate digital divide policy.

In the late 1990s, U.S. policy focused on the need to expand the means by which citizens could access the Internet. A report released by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) in 1995 highlighted the ways in which certain sectors of American society where falling behind in the information society. The belief was that new technologies would become increasingly important to civic life and those who did not have access would be left behind. While the discourse of media access often focuses on the Internet, social movements often negotiate access with the diffusion of new communication technologies. For example, with the expansion of cable television in the 1980s, community groups advocated for access to new technologies to create local channels and content (Fuller 1994). Community access to new technologies stems from the notion of information poverty (Tichendor and Donohue, 1970) and information inequality (Schiller 1996). While information poverty refers to unequal distribution of information resources, information inequality refers to the notion that corporations control too much of the information that is available for citizens. In regard to the Internet, U.S. policy was based on the idea that the government not only had a stake in promoting access, but also training. Basic activities, such as paying taxes, e-commerce, and online banking, were becoming increasingly digitized and if citizens were not prepared, they would be disadvantaged. Additionally, as more jobs required a certain amount of technological literacy, citizens needed to be competent with computers and the Internet in order to participate fully.

Following on the NTIA report, a significant amount of resources were placed into providing public access. The E-rate program drew from the Universal Service Fund to provide discounts for access and hardware for schools and libraries. While initial funding was directed toward educational institutions, later initiatives were based on capacity-building in communities at-large. The Technology Opportunities Program (TOPS), funded through the Department of Commerce, provided grants for non-profits to establish community technology centers in underserved communities.

However, with a change in administration in 2000, the fate of these programs hung in the balance. In 2002, a report titled A Nation Online: How Americans Are Expanding Their Use of the Internet, promoted an optimistic tone stating that Internet penetration had grown to over fifty percent and that the problem of the digital divide was now solved. FCC Chairman Michael Powell was skeptical whether the digital divide was really a pressing social issue. Indeed, because access is widely available and affordable, the notion is that citizens should be adopting the technology in great numbers. To this end, in 2001, Powell stated, “I think there is a Mercedes divide. I would like to have one, but I can't afford one” (Pearce 2001). The shift in administration has had drastic effects on the amount of funding available for community initiatives. For example, the TOPS program is no longer operational. As a result, there are several communities that, although they received some grants for providing technology, no longer have the means to operate these sites or provide training.

One of the shortcomings in understanding the impact from funding these initiatives is the ways in which outcomes or impacts are measured. The NTIA reports merely analyze Census data to track home computer and Internet usage. Indeed, beyond access, there is little empirical evidence that shows the impact of public access initiatives, which in part, has led to decreased funding. Instead, there are broad assumptions about the benefits of new technologies and its impact on education and economic development. More recent scholarship has shifted from infrastructure to usage, which begins to illuminate the quality of access. These reports study what people do online and the Internet’s impact on everyday life (Pew 2002; Royal 2004). Additionally, scholars are making concrete recommendations on how technology can be used to promote economic development and civic engagement, as well as provide efficient government resources (Bertot, 2003; Rowe, 2003; Strover, 2003).

However, as new technologies expand and change, inequalities will continue to persist unless a more theoretical and comprehensive understanding of why technologies are of social and economic importance is incorporated into analysis. It is difficult to predict what other new technologies will arise and instead policymakers and researchers should work on framing issues in terms of democratic ideals. Much of the implications of new technologies and the Internet have led to policymakers shifting away from access toward implications for speech rights, including privacy, intellectual property and censorship. For example, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 placed a ban on technology that attempted to circumvent copyright technologies on digital works. While this Act was seen as protecting musical artists, many argued that it violated the notion of “fair use” which allows individuals limited abilities to duplicate copyrighted works for private use. Many of these new policies stem from an investment in the marketplace model. While economics can be an important incentive for developing competition, economics must not overshadow the underlying role that communication plays in democratic societies. The current shift away from funding public access toward a consumer choice model continues to disadvantage groups who either cannot afford private Internet access or live in geographically remote areas where access is inadequate or nonexistent. Additionally, this economic model has privileged the commercial capacity of the Internet, rather than its communicative potential (Warschaeur 2003). In this way, the Internet is seen as merely a tool rather than an impetus, providing the means to communicate but not necessarily guaranteeing that communication will take place. At the core of the debates must be an inclusion of a right to communicate. Protecting the content of online communication is only one aspect of analysis, but there is a need to protect why it is essential to produce as well as consume online content. In the end, we must continue to think about the role of communication in democratic processes, why it is important, and how new technologies may help, not solve, the problem.

Global Digital Divide: International Context

International efforts to address the global digital divide move beyond the protection of speech rights to an incorporation of how technologies will help to promote democratic communication. The Communication Rights in the Information Society (CSIS) campaign and the World Forum for Communication Rights (WFCR) are led by an international coalition of scholars and activists invested in democratizing new technologies. These initiatives emerged in response to the increasing privatization of the Internet and the need to include human rights into discussions about the information society. Goals of this coalition include increasing democratic environments to access technologies, reclaiming public use of collective knowledge, ensuring civil and political rights, and securing equitable and affordable use of new technologies. According to the WFCR website, “The World Forum on Communication Rights is an independent civil-society led initiative, open to all seeking democratic, just and participative media and communication.” (WFCR, 2002)

Cees Hamelink helped to organize the WFCR in December 2003 in Geneva and the event was held alongside the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). WSIS is a project of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to bring together world leaders to actively address the global digital divide. The goal of WFCR was to make a clear statement that communication rights are still in the forefront of discussion. In the end, members intended to develop an International Charter on Communication Rights.

While Hamelink was critical of the WSIS, the summit was a proactive response to the global digital divide. Summits and conferences, such as WSIS, play key roles in how the UN operates. Summits involve heads of state and government, and high profile world leaders from intergovernmental agencies and NGOs. Often, summits place peace and development issues at the top of their agenda. Goals usually are to allow free exchange of ideas about the topics, create a plan of action, and develop declaration of principles.

The UN defines the problem of the digital divide as multi-layered. As the WSIS website states, “paradoxically, while the digital revolution extended the frontiers of the global village, the vast majority of the world remains unhooked from this unfolding phenomenon. With the ever-widening gulf between knowledge and ignorance, the development gap between the rich and the poor among and within countries has also increased” (WSIS, 2002).

Much of the stated goals of the WSIS were to go beyond access to harness the potential of information and communication technologies. For example, one goal was to create a “common desire to build a people-centered, inclusive and development-oriented Information Society” (WSIS, 2002). Other goals also included sustainable development and improving quality of life. Additionally, they encouraged public/private partnerships to provide funding for closing the gaps. The WSIS has two phases. The first phase occurred in Geneva 2003 and the second phase will be held in Tunis 20005.

Participants in the WFCR clearly stated that the WSIS failed to address communication rights and instead focused on how new technologies would be economically beneficial for developing countries. This critique is part of a larger critique of the information society which has promoted “uninhibited technological euphoria” (Hamelink 2004, 130). Focusing on developing infrastructure, rather than the communication process, many initiatives are short-sighted because they favor technology over people. Benefits of information and communication technologies (ICTs) tend to include the notion that knowledge and information contribute to well-being and progress, increasing citizens’ quality of life and productivity. Hamelink calls discussions on the digital divide as merely “conveniently distracting smoke screens” (132). Hamelink writes “the aspiration to solve the digital divide offers good illustration of vision without analysis” (132). Instead, Hamelink argues that policymakers should focus on four dimensions of the problem: technological, cultural, sociopolitical, and economic.

Hamelink suggests that there are several myths perpetuated by the information society: that the acquisition of information is a higher goal, that creating more knowledge and gathering information equals power, and leads to less conflict. However, citizens can only gain power if necessary infrastructure for production, processing, storage, retrieval and transportation is accessible to all. The difference between these approaches lies in the importance of the capacity to communicate or engage versus informing or receiving. Hamelink writes, “connecting is not the same as communicating” (137). The real core focus, then, is how to shape communication societies to protect human rights.

Addressing the global digital divide is an ongoing process, yet how important the role of communication will be in solving inequality is still open to debate. The right to communicate is not yet considered part of the UDHR but the spirit of why communication is both an individual and collective right is at the forefront of initiatives that are bringing communication technologies to developing countries. While activists invested in communication rights are critical of the WSIS for promoting an economic model rather than a human rights model of access, the WSIS provides an unprecedented opportunity for reshaping global society. While guaranteeing speech rights is an essential goal of the WSIS, it is not the only goal. The U.S. can learn from this comprehensive understanding of the social role of technology that moves beyond a focus on infrastructure to one of promoting communication processes. U.S. policy tends to focus too heavily on the role of speech rights in addressing Internet access, creating conditions to promote the marketplace without a theoretical framework of what goods will be sold and why citizens would want to buy them.

Conclusion

In this paper, I tried to draw some connections between speech rights in both the national and international contexts in order to argue for increased government intervention to guarantee access to new technologies. In the U.S., while the content of information is often protected from censorship, the means to produce these messages is often balanced between public and private interests. This balance is reflected in both neoliberal and participatory democratic theories of the role of communication in society. Achieving this balance has proven difficult because the underlying reasons why citizens should communicate often remain unquestioned.

Instead, the international context helps to shed light on global initiatives to address these issues. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is designed to address more than just civil and political rights, but also social/cultural and collective rights. This shift of thinking about rights in terms of more than just a political action provides a framework for thinking about the role of the individual in society and the responsibility of the state to the individual. While there are criticisms of the UDHR, mainly that it is western in thought and tradition, the UN has become the leading agency for protecting rights and creating plans of action to work toward global peace and development, which includes the global digital divide.

The emergence a growing global digital divide led some scholars to argue for a new human right; the right to communicate. This human right would guarantee that the process of communication, which includes the idea that humans have a need not only to receive information, but also to be heard and engage in a dialogic process, would be protected. While Article 19, similar to the U.S. First Amendment, guarantees freedom of expression and opinion, it does not necessarily protect the means through which to communicate. While the UN has not explicitly added the right to communicate to the UDHR, it does recognize that communication rights are important to secure in the age of information.

U.S. policymakers can learn from these emerging international trends. Unfortunately, many well-meaning initiatives in the late 1990s failed to document significant impacts and outcomes on bridging the digital divide. As a result, progressive initiatives like the TOPS program were eliminated because they could not prove they were making a difference. In this paper, I have tried to argue that focusing on infrastructure, rather than developing measures to gauge the communication process, is short-sighted. Additionally, the current shift to protecting speech rights rather than speech opportunities negatively defines the ideology of free speech that encompasses American society. Researchers should focus their attentions on finding innovative ways to gauge the impact and significance of digital divide projects. These measures could include qualitative research, developing measures for technological literacy and competency, and measuring increased quality of life. A techno-optimism that prevailed in the 1990s has now turned into techno-skepticism. The assumption that the problem is solved is short-sighted since it is difficult to predict how new technologies will continue to develop. The current approach ignores existing social inequalities, such as racism and sexism, and instead is too deterministic of technology. Rather than chasing waterfalls, by going after the latest innovation, we should follow rivers, such as examining the impact of technology in people’s lives, in order to solve this important social problem.

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[1] Larry Irving, commenting on President Bush’s 2002 decision to eliminate the Technology Opportunities Program, an initiative that funds public access centers in the U.S. Quoted from“Digital Divide Slugfest”, CBSnews.com, February 6, 2002. Accessed http:///www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/02/06/politics/printable328402.shtml. 11 November 2004.

[2] The League of Nations, existing between 1919-1945, is considered to be a pre-cursor to the establishment of the Untied Nations.

[3] UNESCO is an acronym for the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. The U.S. rejoined UNESCO in 1993.

[4] The UN’s Millennium Project outlines strategies and approaches for advancing world development, such as solving world hunger and human rights abuses.